# CONNECTICUT SUPREME COURT

FBT FA 19 6088163 CHRISTOPHER AMBROSE v.

KAREN AMBROSE

# SUPERIOR COURT FAIRFIELD JD AT RFTD

FEBURARY 22, 2022

## APPLICATION CERTIFICATION §52-265a PB §83-1

Application to Chief Justice for certification of direct appeal by statute §52-265a brought in substantial public interest for violation of due process, equal protection by Adelman, J in derogation of Fourteenth Amendment rights, being criminal conduct, 18 USC §242. Adelman, J did sua sponte issue an order curtailing liberties relying solely on absolute judicial discretion.

Questions of law: (1) Is there deprivation of constitutional rights when liberty is denied absent due process of Fourteenth Amendment, alluding only to unenumerated inherent court powers? (2) Are there concealed judicial procedures allowing application of alluded inherent powers? (3) Is judicial criticism of pro se pleadings for volume and rule compliance a manifestation of lack of impartiality, bias & prejudice requiring disqualification under Canon Rule 2.11? (4) Does the court violate CGS §51-14 that rules do not abridge rights? (5) Does the court violate CGS §52-123 prohibiting circumstantial defects from abating pleadings? (6) Is the pendente lite restriction to filing simply prior restraint, a derogation of First Amendment rights? (7) Is sua sponte curtailment of liberty by concealed inherent powers, absent notice, summons, hearing, counsel, witnesses, a violation of due process? (8) Is the judicial complaint of 50 motions in four weeks arbitrary & capricious, abuse of discretion given 577 docket

entries, over 135 weeks, with 187 orders, on 204 motions, where children have been forcibly isolated with no hugs from mom for 666 days? (9) Does discretionary rejection of pleadings violate due process duty to determine every question which may arise in the cause; Ahneman v Ahneman, 243 Conn 471, 484. (10) Is the fuss over protected pleadings contrasted to the inflicted harm of child isolation for 666 days not prima facie evidence of judicial misconduct? (11) How many motions are legally allowed to be filed by a pro se mom in protection of children? (12) How is equal protection, fairness, impartiality upheld when mother is restricted in filing, but the GAL sits and watches 38 days of trial, billing \$400/hr by direction of the court? Bias & Prejudice? Harassment? Racketeering? Judicial mental impairment? (13) Does the Branch deceive the public by alluding to trial management standard that results in 38 trial days spread out over 330 days in a special docket advertised on judicial website: RFTD "One judge presides over and manages the docket. The goal is to handle contested cases involving children quickly and without interruption. Cases are referred to the Regional Family Trial Docket by the family presiding judge when they meet the program criteria: child focused issue; ready for trial; family relations case study completed and not more than nine months old; and an attorney has been appointed for the children."? (14) Does the Chief Court Administrator deliberately not publish RFTD docket rules, in violation of law, CGS §51-5a? (15) Is there due process violation where the court specifies use of JD-FM-202 / PB §25-26, a modification rule, which does not apply at trial? (16) Does the court apply such practice rule to abridge rights prohibited by CGS §51-14? (17) Is PB §25-26 an administrative end run around SCOTUS ruling that res judicata has no application to award of custody, being provisional and temporary in character, lacking quality of finality.

Halvey v Halvey, 330 US 610. (18) Does PB §25-26 violate state constitution Article First, §10 for open courts for remedy by due course of law, and right and justice administered without sale, denial or delay; given the rule is not 'law', but an administrative impediment invoked by a family rules committee to create sale, denial, and delay; being a constitutional violation. (19) Did the state supreme court improperly act to overturn SCOTUS Halvey, supra in Cleveland v Cleveland165 Conn 95, 100, claiming: "To limit the use of the power given to the trial courts by §46-23 and to give effect to the principle of res judicata, there has developed a rule, which is accepted by this court, that before an order as to custody ... of children may be modified there must have been a material change of circumstances after the order was issued"? (20) Is there constitutional error when the state high court acts to overturn SCOTUS, 'to give effect to res judicata' on custody orders when the matter was settled in *Halvey, supra*? (21) Is there violation of Fourteenth Amendment when the state high court claims broad discretion controls family matters, absent application of the Fourteenth Amendment, so stated in Yontef v Yontef, 185 Conn275, 279? (22) Did the state high court err by ignoring Parskey's dissent in McGaffin v Roberts, 193 Conn 393, 410 then again when SCOTUS handed down Troxel v Granville, 530 US 57, 65, ruling that Fourteenth Amendment protects the parent-child bond, so vindicating Parskey's opinion that best interest discretional decisions cannot swallow the rule of law? (23) Does this court commit constitutional treason in Yontef, supra by ignoring heightened due process protections of Fourteenth Amendment cited in Troxel, supra? (24) Is it a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment for the court to uphold a 666 day forced isolation of kids from mom, absent state interest, absent due process of accusation, investigation, charges,

notice, summons, counsel, hearing, adjudication, and appeal? (25) Does the trial court's discretionary decision of stripping a fit parent of custody, absent state interest or codified procedure violate heightened due process protections for fundamental liberty, so stated in *Troxel, supra* imposed by the Fourteenth Amendment? (26) Is court claim of *parens patriae* powers in a dissolution action a constitutional due process violation when the state does not appear in claim of child protection? (27) Is there constitutional due process violation when the court takes up claim of sole custody by one fit parent against another? (28) Does the court lack subject matter jurisdiction to entertain a custody fight, absent state interest in light of heightened due process protections of fundamental liberties under the Fourteenth Amendment? (29) Is there a Fourteenth Amendment due process/equal protection violation when the court discriminates in violation of Americans with Disabilities Act, Title II, to uphold child isolation, by claim of broad discretion and best interests?

Substantial public interest: The sovereign people grow suspicious of a court system that runs on absolute discretion, devoid of constitutional protections of due process and equal protection enforced upon it by the Fourteenth Amendment.

Delay works substantial injustice, condones denial of due process, abandons equal protection, upholds judicial tyranny, incites imminent lawless action of a sovereign people betrayed by Chief Justice Robinson, in his defiance of Fourteenth Amendment.

#### Argument

The public is aware that state case law and practice rules in family matters ignore the requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment. The meaningless terms of 'broad discretion', 'best interests' confused with royal *parens patriae* powers combine to leave

no process, no heightened protection against judicial interference with fundamental liberty interests. The absolute discretion doctrine that allows whimsical jurists to control parent-child bonds is traced to unconstitutional rulings written by Peters, J in Yontef, claiming family law is 'broad discretion'; by Healy, J in *McGaffin*, voiding statute to usurp undelegated powers, called out by Parskey's dissent; the obscene ruling by Bogdanski, J in Cleveland defeating SCOTUS ruling in Halvey, custody orders never final, illegally giving effect of res judicata. The Fourteenth Amendment voids these errant rulings, clearly stated by Justice Sandra Day-O'Connor in Troxel, maliciously ignored by Chief Justices Richard Robinson, Chase Rogers, David Borden, Francis McDonald, depriving Fourteenth Amendment parental protections, in grotesque disrespect of the federal Constitution. Discretional isolation of kids from mom for 666 days proves suspension of Fourteenth Amendment protections. In simple terms, the Fourteenth Amendment bars derogation of fundamental liberty interests by judicial discretion, giving cause to grant this application.

WHEREFORE, application for certification made in the pubic interest for parental protections of heightened due process requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment.

Karen Riordan, Pro Se

DOCKET NO: FBTFA196088163S

AMBROSE, CHRISTOPHER V. AMBROSE, KAREN

SUPERIOR COURT

## JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF FAIRFIELD AT BRIDGEPORT

2/18/2022

#### ORDER

No Counsel Present. No Parties Present.

The following order is entered in the above matter:

**ORDER**:

In the approximately four weeks since the defendant entered her own appearance she has filed some fifty plus motions many of which are duplicative of prior motions on which orders have entered. Her motions frequently do not comply with the Practice Book in that they are argumentative and contain editorial comments rather than being fact based allegations. Accordingly, the defendant must from this point on request leave of the court to file any new motions. The appropriate form is available on the Judicial website. This order is supported by the court's inherent power to control its own docket and the trial management of a case.

429706

Judge: GERARD I ADELMAN

This document may be signed or verified electronically and has the same validity and status as a document with a physical (pen-to-paper) signature. For more information, see Section I.E. of the State of Connecticut Superior Court E-Services Procedures and Technical Standards (https://jud.ct.gov/external/super/E-Services/e-standards.pdf), section 51-193c of the Connecticut General Statutes and Connecticut Practice Book Section 4-4.

# Order On Pre Appeal Application for Certification pursuant to G.S. § 52-265a SC210232

Docket Number: FBTFA196088163S Issue Date: 2/23/2022 Sent By: Supreme/Appellate

#### Order On Pre Appeal Application for Certification pursuant to G.S. § 52-265a SC210232

FBTFA196088163S CHRISTOPHER AMBROSE v. KAREN AMBROSE

Notice Issued: 2/23/2022 9:58:51 AM

**Notice Content:** 

Motion Filed: 2/22/2022 Motion Filed By: Court Order Date: 02/23/2022

#### **Order: Denied**

Today, Chief Justice Richard A. Robinson denied the application for certification to appeal pursuant to Connecticut General Statute § 52-265a, which was filed on February 22, 2022, by Karen Riordan.

By the Court Matyi, Luke P.

Notice sent to Counsel of Record

Hon. Gerard I. Adelman

Clerk, Superior Court, FBTFA196088163S