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office of the Chief Disciplinary Counsel
- Evan Knowlton RFD 2021
12/10/*

NO. FBT-FA-19-6088163S

CHRISTOPHER AMBROSE

v.

KAREN AMBROSE

: SUPERIOR COURT
:
: J.D. OF FAIRFIELD AT
:
: REGIONAL FAMILY
: TRIAL DOCKET - MIDDLETOWN
:
: DECEMBER 10, 2021

**Memorandum of Decision Denying Motion to Recuse
Judge Gerard Adelman for Bias**

- 1. Flaws in the judicial system aren't the product of Jewish conspiracies, abuse conspiracies, or disfavor toward the disabled.**

There are those who say the Family Division of this court currently isn't serving the public interest very well. The undersigned is one of them. Indeed, the undersigned is not alone in hoping for a better system. The leadership of Connecticut's Judicial Branch has been giving the Family Division special attention precisely because it has openly declared that our system can better serve the public. But, before we go any further, let it be understood that nothing written in this opinion necessarily reflects the views of any other judge or official. Instead, what follows reflects judicial independence.

Sometimes the problems in the Family Division appear to be the process that has grown up over time. It's slow. It's cumbersome. Cases haven't moved quickly enough—glacially in some instances. The pandemic hasn't exactly helped.

In some cases, over-analysis by costly experts and guardians-ad-litem has unfairly delayed cases from getting decided or has even financially broken the parties with enormous expenses. Judges traditionally don't police this aspect of a case, so it has too

often gotten out of hand. This court wrote about this issue in its decision in *Templeton v. Kannan*.¹

But sometimes, it's about the lawyers. Sometimes the lawyers waste time. Sometimes the lawyers tie up a case for years with frivolous motions, harassing discovery, and baseless accusations that divert the court in custody cases from where it should focus like a laser: on getting a decision about the best interests of the children and allowing that decision to be reviewed by an appellate court if needed.

This is one of those cases. The lawyer in this case is Nickola J. Cunha. Attorney Cunha has disagreed with the major rulings in this case made by two judges. She is free to do so. She has been vocal in her belief that her client deserves greater access to her child. This is all quite appropriate.

But like a few other lawyers, she has done intolerable things too. She has made this case not about getting a divided family on its way to a stable life apart. She has not made the case about the best interest of the children. She has made it a case about a case. She has clogged the docket, delayed the trial, and cost the parties a fortune by repeatedly hurling baseless personal accusations against lawyers, judges, the guardian, and many others. Rather than get the case tried and appeal it if she doesn't like the result, Attorney Cunha has made every problem in the case worse. Indeed, her behavior has become the biggest problem in the case.

Attorney Cunha has done many things we will talk more about later, but her latest move has been to seek for the second time, and in the middle of trial, to disqualify Judge

¹ NO. HHB-FA-19-6054337S (September 27, 2021).

Gerard Adelman from deciding this case. She alleges three things in support of her motion: (1) he is biased against non-Jews; (2) he is biased against the disabled, and (3) he is biased against women claiming abuse.

2. Judge Adelman is not biased against non-Jews, nor could his impartiality be reasonably questioned on this issue.

Attorney Cunha's claims separate her from any small group of time-wasting or over-charging lawyers. They may frustrate the court, but her claims take the court flat aback.

Attorney Cunha alleges that Judge Gerard Adelman is part of a Jewish conspiracy. She alleges that Judge Adelman, Judge Grossman, Attorney Hurwitz (the guardian ad litem) and Dr. Jessica Biren Caverly (the custody evaluator) are Jews and "racketeers" conspiring to help Jews make money over non-Jews in court. This conspiracy theory was repeated on the record in court multiple times, not by just anyone, but by the attorney for the defendant, Attorney Cunha.

Doubtless there are members of the public who believe a variety of conspiracy theories— about elections, about 9/11, about Satan-worshiping child abusers running the United States, about wildfires being sparked by laser beams in space. Our country doesn't regulate such thoughts. It can't stop the average person from waiting patiently for the Zombie Apocalypse.

But lawyers are different. They are officers of this court. They are bound by a Code of Professional Responsibility. It charges them with a duty to truth. The Code warns that they may be punished if they frivolously make false claims in court. The Code makes a lawyer both "an officer of the legal system" and "a public citizen having special responsibility for the quality of justice."

What is this “justice” lawyers are responsible for? To some “justice” doubtless means having things their own way. And those who think this aren’t a tiny minority. Most people think they are essentially good and that what they demand from others is only fair. But we can’t all have it our own way. Sometimes what we want is directly at odds with what someone else wants. That’s why we have courts—to sort out our differences peacefully.

So, in court we talk about justice, and when we talk about justice we must also talk about “truth”. Truth is another basic American value lawyers are supposed to prize and protect. Justice in our courts begins with a search for truth.

Lawyers know that truth isn’t whatever we want it to be. If a person swears that a piece of paper says only, “I love you”, we can read it and see what it says. If the paper says only, “I hate you”, we can conclude that the person wasn’t telling us the truth about what the paper said. We can say that the person made a false claim. If the person made the claim to deceive us and hurt us, we can call it a lie.

Naturally, finding what’s true in other circumstances can be trickier. In court lawyers help judges and juries get at the truth by what we call “evidence.” Evidence is basically the reliable combination of what we hear and see. What we feel and smell. Even sometimes, what we taste.

This means that— in court— truth isn’t found by lawyers blurting out their sneaking suspicions, their fears, or their prejudices. Courts don’t decide something is true because some loudmouth on the street shouts it at us repeatedly. We also don’t find something is true because it helps our friends and confounds our enemies or because we are angry and looking for someone to blame. Baseless assertion, blind self-interest, anger, and

bigotry are not the tools that responsible men and women use to find the truth, and, in court, they are expressly rejected. In court they have no place at all.

Instead of these things, every lawyer knows that we sort out truth using evidence derived from our five senses—and those of others too. To get at the truth we often check one person's sensations against those of others. That is, courts often decide what's true only after hearing multiple witnesses to the same event. Each witness contributes their evidence about what happened on an occasion, and we compare it to what others have said they heard, saw, felt, smelled, or tasted.

This means that when person A is accused of shooting person B, lawyers can ask those who were present when the shot was fired to say what they saw and heard, felt, or smelled. From this we can do our best to sort out what happened. In criminal cases we must be sure beyond a reasonable doubt. In civil cases—including family cases like this one—we must decide what's *most likely* true.

No matter what rule we must follow, we also know we are flawed—witnesses, lawyers, jurors, judges—the whole lot. We're human. We can only do our best, and sometimes we get it wrong. In our state, when a lawyer thinks a judge gets something wrong the lawyer may take the case to two other courts above the original judge. Those courts have the power to review the judge's decision and correct the judge when the judge is wrong. And yes. They aren't perfect either.

But that's how it works. We do our best to find *truth* from *evidence*. All judges and lawyers know this. All judges and lawyers will tell you this process is the thing to which they have dedicated their professional lives and personal consciences. This shared belief

in the search for truth is why judges allow lawyers—as trusted, licensed, and regulated professionals— to present cases in front of judges.

That is why it is no small thing for a lawyer to come to court and make the flesh crawl and the conscience clatter with baseless claims about a Jewish conspiracy.

In this case, Attorney Cunha has made such claims. When they were made, the court stayed its hand. It patiently asked Attorney Cunha for evidence to support her claim of a Jewish conspiracy in the courts, starting with how Judge Adelman knew any of the people she accuses are even Jewish.

She claimed that those in the Jewish “community” know who the other Jews are in the various professions and that’s how he would know. She professed no actual knowledge of Judge Adelman’s specific Jewish community activity. She claims “everyone knows” that Judge Adelman, Judge Grossman, Attorney Hurwitz, and Dr. Caverly are all Jews. In short, Attorney Cunha suggested that she had swallowed and asserted in court a typical racist canard— Jews all know each other and are in touch.

Attorney Cunha said Judge Adelman was in touch with the others in his conspiracy to help other Jews make money. The court asked how he did it. Attorney Cunha suggested that Judge Adelman makes them money by always ruling in favor of Jewish lawyers, guardians, etc. When asked where the court might look for evidence that this was true, Attorney Cunha said she had examined many cases and had seen a pattern showing a pro-Jewish conspiracy involving Judge Grossman, Attorney Hurwitz, and Judge Adelman. Attorney Cunha said she had a list of these cases and that when the court examined them the conspiracy would be revealed. The court asked her to provide

the list to the court. The court planned to search carefully for the pattern she insisted she had found and that she insisted the court's examination would confirm.

She obviously didn't have the list handy. She fumbled with some papers for a bit. The court offered to take its fifteen-minute morning recess early so she could find this documentation of the Jewish conspiracy. Attorney Cunha agreed.

When the fifteen minutes were up, Attorney Cunha didn't return to court. Instead, she kept the court waiting an extra quarter of an hour. When she did return, Attorney Cunha admitted she had no list of cases showing the Jewish conspiracy she alleged. Instead, she said she was assembling a list of cases showing Judge Adelman was biased—not against all women as she initially asserted—but against women who claimed abuse.

So much for the Jewish conspiracy.

Clearly, Attorney Cunha hasn't liked Judge Adelman's rulings and complained about them at length and by name at the hearing, but this non-existent list was the only intelligible claim Attorney Cunha made to support her repeated assertion that Judge Adelman was biased against non-Jews as opposed to merely being—in her view—wrong in his rulings.

The other things that Attorney Cunha called direct evidence on this point were both hard to follow and hardly evidence. Attorney Cunha said that two judges talking about what to do with overlapping cases was somehow evidence that one of the judges was also secretly talking to Attorney Cunha's opposing counsel in this case—Attorney Aldrich.

The connection to Attorney Cunha's bias claim is apparently that Attorney Cunha didn't like the ruling that resulted following this supposed conference and that, therefore, it was most likely the product of secret illegal contacts in connection with a Jewish conspiracy. Likewise, she didn't like that the custody evaluator—a person she says is Jewish—was allowed to testify and testify in a closed courtroom. Even though she didn't address any possible other reasons, to Attorney Cunha, ruling against her wishes on this issue can only be explained by the Jewish conspiracy.

This may be so in Attorney Cunha's mind, but this can't be so in a world where we make decisions based on evidence rather than on suspicion, prejudice, and anger. No evidence supports Attorney Cunha's claim.

Judge Adelman is not biased in favor of Jewish lawyers. No reasonable person would question Judge Adelman's impartiality toward non-Jews.

So, given that she had no evidence to support her claims, why would Attorney Cunha readily believe a Jewish conspiracy exists in our courts? Two hundred years ago the judges and lawyers were all Protestants. Should we believe there was then a Protestant conspiracy in the courts? Should we believe today that there is a conspiracy against Protestants by Catholic judges?

This is a very serious matter. Whenever someone makes an empty claim about secret religious cabals of any faith it can breed mindless hatred, and mindless hatred breeds violence. History is replete with it. Catholic against Protestant. Christian against Muslim. Muslim against Jew. Hindu against Muslim, and the reverse of all of them. This mindlessness has dug millions of graves.

Yet here a lawyer is shoveling, in a place devoted to the peaceful resolution of disputes, the same fear of the “other” that has taken so many lives. A lawyer making baseless claims in court against a judge based on his religion sets off the loudest alarm bells in the lawyers’ Code of Professional Responsibility. The court will say more about this later.

3. Judge Adelman is not biased against the disabled nor could his impartiality be reasonably questioned on this issue.

We haven’t finished with Attorney Cunha’s claims. Attorney Cunha also accused Judge Adelman of a bias against the disabled. The sole basis for this claim is that she says that her client has disabilities that slow her ability to respond to questions. She says Judge Adelman snapped impatiently at these delays.

The claim is made up out of thin air. Attorney Cunha didn’t show that she or anyone else ever told Judge Adelman that the witness was disabled. Judge Adelman couldn’t have intended to punish Attorney Cunha’s client because of her disability when he was never told of any disability. Of equal importance, Attorney Cunha can hardly say with any respect for truth that Judge Adelman has a general bias against the disabled based on the single incident she alleges. She offered no evidence on this point.

Judge Adelman is not biased against the disabled. No reasonable person would question Judge Adelman’s impartiality toward the disabled.

4. Judge Adelman is not biased against women, nor could his impartiality be reasonably questioned on this issue.

Attorney Cunha claimed she could prove in two ways that Judge Adelman was biased against women who claim abuse. She expressly and emphatically staked her credibility on the second claim, so we will save that for last.

The first proof Attorney Cunha claimed was his rejection of women's claims in a series of five cases:

1. HHD FA07 4034225 S Thaner, Robert B. v. Thaner, Lori A.
2. FBT FA14 4045766 S Stvan, Thomas Beck v. Stvan Paige Taylor
3. FBT FA06 4015691 S Sorrentino, Saverio v. Sorrentino, Kathryn
4. FBT FA15 5031098 S Beall-Gomes, Tara v. Gomes, Daniel
5. FBT FA11 4054779 S, Lucia Cinotti v. Michael Divers, Cinotti v. Adelman, 16-1804 (2d Cir. 2017), Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.

Judge Adelman has been on the bench for many years. He has handled hundreds of cases, so it is hard to think that five cases would be a fair sample of his work. Nonetheless, the court—without retrying each case—examined aspects of each of them for signs of bias against women claiming abuse.

Each of the cases involved bitter disputes between parents. Each of them involved rulings by several judges other than Judge Adelman—sometimes as many as six. One of them shows that Judge Adelman's only activity in the case was to accept an agreement from a divorcing couple. Another is a case where the mother had been found by DCF, not to have claimed abuse, but to have neglected her children by not taking abuse seriously enough.

Where Judge Adelman wrote a decision in these cases, he justified his rulings from the evidence. Doubtless, when he ruled for one side, the other side may have been

furious and deeply believed Judge Adelman was wrong. Indeed, in some cases a disappointed party appealed to a higher court and in each appeal Judge Adelman's decision was upheld. Were the three appeals court judges also biased against women with abuse claims? Are they all part of a conspiracy too? Attorney Cunha made no such claim.

The most dramatic of the claims was doubtless fraught with fear. It involved a missing teenage boy whose custody had been assigned, to his mother's frustration, to his father. Judge Adelman was convinced the mother knew the child's whereabouts but that she was contemptuously refusing to reveal them. Judge Adelman jailed the mother to induce her to tell the court where the boy was. Was the boy really missing? Was he in danger? Was he okay and secretly living with his mother?

Prison is an extreme step. It requires exquisite judgment. Sometimes it works. Sometimes it doesn't. That is the tough job of a judge. It isn't for this judge to decide if Judge Adelman was wrong to do what he did. But the focus of his concern seemed to be right. It was on a missing child.

Indeed, this judge has no business saying that Judge Adelman was right or wrong in any of his judgments. But this judge can say that Judge Adelman produced judgments made in the same way as other judges—they focused on evidence, they explained reasons, and they made distinctions and decisions. These decisions had to be made with the best efforts of some flawed human—we are all flawed— and then the decision must be stood by in the resulting storm. In tough cases judges simply must expect someone will be angry with them and may even accuse them of wicked things. It goes with the job. It doesn't make the accusations true.

To do a thorough job here, this judge didn't stop at studying the small number of instances from years ago. It also chose to study a sample of decisions from thirteen recent cases as well:

FBTFA156053635S, BEVILACQUA, PAMELA V. BEVILACQUA, JOHN:

- Memorandum issued on 11/27/2018 after a 3 day trial
- Post judgement memorandum of decision issued on 12/12/2019.

HHDFFA155039554S SEDER, LAUREN, T. V. ERRATO, ROBERT, M:

- Memorandum of decision on motions issued on 6/29/2017
- Another memorandum of decision on motions from 5/2/2018
- Final Memorandum issued on 8/29/2019 after a 10 day trial
- post judgment memorandum of decision on 12/16/2019.

NNHFA165037610S COSSABOOM, JASON V. WRIGHT, KIMBERLY:

- Memorandum issued on 1/8/2019 after a 5-day trial.

KNOFA176103209S ROACH, JANET V. POTTS, DOUGLAS G.:

- Memorandum of decision issued on 3/26/2019 after a 4 day trial.
- Post judgment memorandum of decision issued on 6/20/2019, corrected memorandum issued the same day.

UWYFA175020709S NICOLICCHIA, KAREN V. VIGARIO, PAUL:

- Memorandum of decision on post judgment motions issued on 4/4/2019 after a 3 day trial.

MMXFA104012793S ROPIAK, JOHN V. DIPIERDOMENICO, ANN:

- Memorandum of decision on post judgment motions issued on 5/9/2019,
- corrected memorandum issued on 5/21/2019
- This is a paper file but it is located here in Middletown so I can provide the memorandum if you would like to read it.

FBTFA176063906S OVERLEY, MONICA R V. OVERLEY, MARK S:

- memorandum of decision issued on 7/11/2019 after a 4 day trial

FBTFA176067023S DE LUCIA, JOSEPH J. V. CASTILLO, JUANITA:

- memorandum of decision issued on 6/18/2019 after a 3-day trial.

FBTFA176066429S RENSTRUP, HEDYEH V. RENSTRUP, JENS:

- memorandum of decision issued on 1/6/2020 after a 5-day trial.

FBTFA186077118S BARROSO, FATIMA M V. BARROSO, ANIBAL J:

- memorandum of decision issued on 12/15/2020 after a 14 day trial
- corrected memorandum of decision issued on 12/29/2020.

FSTFA166029372S MORALES, MARIBEL V. MEEHAN, ROBERT F.:
-memorandum of decision issued on 2/11/2020 after a 6 day trial

HHBFA165017190S DAVIS, AMY, A. V. DAVIS, ALEXANDER, F., SR.
-memorandum of decision on post judgment motions issued on 11/12/2019
-corrected memorandum issued on 1/29/2020.

MMXFA186021225S DUSZYNSKI, ROBIN V. DUSZYNSKI, ROBERT
-Memorandum of decision issued on 12/2/2020 after a 6 day trial
-corrected memorandum of decision issued on 7/8/2021.

The court's review of these cases did nothing but confirm them to be ordinary decisions made in the ordinary way, showing claims, evidence, thought by the judge, and a decision likely to be little different than the decision most judges would make in the same cases. Far from any bias against women or women claiming abuse, the decisions showed that the evidence led Judge Adelman to lean toward the women in these cases more than the men. Had some worrisome pattern emerged, the court might have gone on to review Judge Adelman's other decisions. But the decisions revealed only the opposite of what Attorney Cunha staked her motion on. This is enough to say that he has shown no bias against women or women who claim abuse and that no reasonable person would question Judge Adelman's impartiality toward women or women who complain about abuse.

Yet there is still one last point on this topic—a point on which Attorney Cunha seemed willing to stake everything—especially her credibility and the court's belief in her integrity.

Attorney Cunha made this point repeatedly, unhesitatingly, and despite being pressed closely on it by the court. She insisted that the Department of Children Families

report (Exhibit 71) records that a multi-disciplinary task force found that Christopher Ambrose had sexually assaulted his children. She asserted that Judge Adelman was ignoring this because of his bias against women who report child abuse.

Remember the simple example the court gave earlier about telling the truth? When someone tells you what a document says, you can look at it. If it doesn't say what the person claims, you know that person hasn't told you the truth.

The court looked carefully at the document at issue here. The DCF document is over 90 pages long. The court read all of it.

The answer is there in black and white. There is no debate. It's not unclear in any way. It is certain that DCF did not conclude that Christopher Ambrose abused his children in any way. It is certain that no multi-disciplinary panel of experts concluded that Christopher Ambrose abused his children in any way.

Instead, the report shows that over half a dozen DCF experts and supervisors studied the abuse claims. A male child told a medical professional during a visit to Yale that his father once touched his penis through his clothes while tickling him –by accident in one version, not likely by accident in another version. A female child said her father touched her breast and buttocks through her clothes. She said she was angry with him and missed her mother. At certain points while DCF investigated, the father was separated from his children.

DCF repeatedly spoke with the children. They spoke with one of the children's therapists, two other therapists, the guardian ad litem, and a custody evaluator. They

spoke with Christopher Ambrose repeatedly and monitored how he was running his home. They spoke with the children's mother, her therapist, and her lawyer.

All three experts involved with the children said they had no concerns about the father's behavior and that no child made any abuse claim to them. On page 18 of the report, we can see that as of February 5, 2021, DCF had declared the abuse claims to be "unsubstantiated".

Lest there be any confusion, we can look at Merriam-Webster's online dictionary. "Unsubstantiated" means the claims are "not proven to be true". The dictionary lists other words with similar meanings—synonyms—for "unsubstantiated". Using those synonyms means that saying there was an "unsubstantiated" claim of abuse is like saying, there is a "baseless, foundationless, groundless, invalid, nonvalid, unfounded, unreasonable, unsupported, unwarranted" claim of abuse.

Clear enough? It means DCF didn't believe the abuse claims against Christopher Ambrose. The report doesn't document DCF or anyone else believing Christopher Ambrose abused his children.

The DCF conclusion was reviewed and confirmed by DCF managers. The police investigated the matter too. The report shows on page 67 that the Madison Police Department studied the matter and decided not to accuse Christopher Ambrose of child abuse or anything else, despite an "anonymous caller" telling them that Ambrose was engaged in the trafficking of "young Brown Latin American boys."

When she pointed the court to this document, it was a chance for Attorney Cunha to tell the truth. She knew the court was going to look at the document. She knew what it said. The document either showed some group conclusion of abuse or it didn't.

It didn't. Plain as day. This means that Attorney Cunha, a court officer, lied to a judge emphatically, repeatedly, and with ample warning that the judge would check for the truth.

5. The court will hold a hearing to consider whether to discipline Attorney Cunha.

And this leads us to the last point. Can a court stand idly by when it realizes a lawyer has blatantly lied to it, when the lawyer has made astounding and utterly empty claims against a judge based upon his race, and unsupported claims about his alleged biases against the disabled and women who allege abuse?

Attorney Cunha has attacked this court with multiple motions to disqualify. She has moved unsuccessfully to disqualify her opposing counsel. She has filed two unsuccessful appeals. She has moved for a mistrial. She has filed an injunction action against this court. She has filed a complaint in juvenile court seeking to circumvent this court and restraining order actions to do the same thing. She has been sanctioned in this case for destroying evidence. One or more of the experts in this case has been sued for malpractice. She capped all this off with lies before this court on this motion, not just about what a document said but with false claims of a judge's bias against people based upon race, disability, and gender.

The rules say the court can't turn a blind eye to this. Indeed, for matters relating to courtroom conduct, judges have primary jurisdiction over lawyers who do not meet their

obligations as officers of the court.² General Statutes § 51-84 says that courts may fine attorneys, suspend them or discipline them for good cause. Practice Book § 1-25 similarly gives courts broad powers to impose sanctions for “[w]illful or repeated failure to comply with rules or orders of the court” Practice Book § 2-44 grants the courts authority to suspend or disbar attorneys “for just cause.” Finally, as the Supreme Court recognized in 2001 in *Millbrook Owners Assn., Inc. v. Hamilton Standard*, courts have “the inherent power to provide for the imposition of reasonable sanctions, to compel the observance of its rules.”³

This court is thus obliged to act on the matters that happen before it on the record. And so, it will.

The motion to disqualify Judge Adelman for violating Rule 2.11 of the Code of Judicial Conduct is denied because it was entirely unsupported and frivolous. No reasonable person would question his impartiality under these circumstances.

Activity in this case including the trial is stayed until further order of the court.

Based upon what has occurred on the record in connection with the latest motion to disqualify Judge Adelman, on January 10, 2022, at 10:00 a.m. the court will hold a hearing on whether to act against Attorney Cunha, and, if action is warranted, what action to take.

Attorney Cunha should have no illusions. The matter is of the utmost seriousness. She would be well advised to be represented at the hearing by an attorney.

² Practice Book § 2-45.

³ 257 Conn. 1, 9-10.

The clerk will send a copy of this ruling to the chief disciplinary counsel. The court would welcome participation by any appropriate disciplinary entity to appear as a friend of the court for the upcoming hearing.

6. Conclusion: Vivid assertion is no substitute for the truth.

Some of those bitterly disappointed by court rulings and some others who thirst for power and attention may have trouble accepting and understanding this ruling. They may even claim that this decision only confirms a conspiracy theory rather than debunks it. But bunk this conspiracy theory is and bunk it will remain.

The possible view that the lack of evidence of a conspiracy proves a conspiracy recalls the reasoning of one character in the movie *Full Metal Jacket*. The character was a Vietnam War helicopter door gunner. While enjoying the indiscriminate shooting of farmers in their fields he laughed: "Anyone who runs, is a VC. Anyone who stands still, is a well-disciplined VC!".


For some people the truth never matters.

But for decent men and women it always will.

Dozens of people—judges, independent experts, state child protection officers, lawyers, court employees, and the police have been involved in this case. The idea that they are involved in anything like the sinister scheme alleged here, should be treated by those who love this country and the truth with the open and outspoken contempt that it deserves.

Those who feel aggrieved by the system by which we handle family disputes should think calmly and well. The process needs to be reformed. This court agrees with them on that. But they should be assured that the purpose of the process has always been justice.

Imperfect, human justice. Let them reflect on that too. If they come to believe it, they have nothing to lose but their bitterness.

BY THE COURT

MOUKAWSHER, J.